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I. INTRODUCTION 
For a decade or more, American constitutional discourse 
has emitted a detectable odor of bigotry toward Roman Catho-
lics who embrace the papal encyclicals of Pope John Paul II. 
The day after President George Bush nominated Judge Clarence 
Thomas to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1991, Vir-
ginia Governor Douglas Wilder said that, although the judge was 
"qualified" to sit on the Court, "he's indicated he's a very devout 
Catholic, and that issue is before us." 1 The Governor told re-
porters, "The question is: How much allegiance does [Mr. Tho-
mas] have to the Pope?"2 At the time, it had been more than 
three decades since Americans overcame fears of papists in high 
places to put William Brennan on the Supreme Coure and John 
* F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research. I thank Walter Berns, Kathleen A. Brady, Hillel Frad-
kin, Mary Ann Glendon, Bishop Ronald H. Haines, Michael W. McConnell, Father 
Richard John Neuhaus, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., Michael Novak, Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Reverend Dr. John Polkinghorne, Reverend William M. Shand III, Steven D. 
Smith, Thomas A. Smith, and Judge Stephen F. Williams for their generous comments. 
The views expressed here are solely my own. This essay was in press at the time of the 
nomination of Senator John Ashcroft to be Attorney General of the United States in 
January 2001, and I have not attempted to expand the scope of the essay to address viola-
tions of the Religious Test Clause with respect to executive branch officials. 
1. Gov. Wilder Is Questioning Role of Thomas's Religion, Wall St. J. A8 (July 3, 
1991) (quoting Gov. Douglas Wilder). 
2. Id.; see also Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law 
and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 57, 287 n.24 (Doubleday, 1993) ("And then 
there is the prominent feminist who grumbled in the summer of 1991 that there are too 
many Catholics on the Supreme Court-discussing Roman Catholics the way that Pat 
Buchanan discusses homosexuals"). 
3. Sec Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All (Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
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Kennedy in the White House.4 Anti-Catholic prejudice has been 
cited, however, as a factor in Alfred E. Smith's loss to Herbert 
Hoover in the presidential election of 1928. Arthur Schlesinger 
has written that "beneath the surface maneuvers of the cam-
paign was the slanderous undercurrent of religious bigotry-
whispers that Smith's election would bring the Pope to America, 
that all Protestant marriages would be annulled and all Protes-
tant children declared bastards. "5 
The intolerance of Governor Wilder's remarks in 1991 
seemed all the more inexplicable because he was the first Afri-
can American to occupy the governor's mansion in the former 
capital of the Confederacy, and thus his own electoral achieve-
ment testified in some measure to the ability of American de-
mocracy to overcome the invidious discrimination of the past. 
Governor Wilder's remarks caused such indignation that he was 
forced to retract them the following day.6 Journalists focused on 
the possible damage to the governor's political career7 but over-
looked the larger issue: Here was a prominent public official 
with presidential ambitions who was evidently unaware that Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution contains the Religious Test Clause, 
which provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States. "8 In addition to that provision, the Senate, in the dis-
charge of its Advice and Consent duties,9 cannot quiz a Supreme 
Court nominee about his religion as a condition of confirming 
him, lest the individual senators violate their own oaths "to sup-
port this Constitution,"10 an obligation that necessarily includes 
supporting the Constitution's prohibition against religious tests. 
Perhaps even more surprising than Governor Wilder's remark 
was the reaction of Senator Orrin Hatch, a Mormon from Utah 
and a senior Republican on (and future chairman of) the Senate 
Judiciary Committee: "I think it's fair to ask if [Judge Thomas's] 
Catholic faith means he would blindly follow the pope. You can 
4. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House 6-7 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965). 
5. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Or-
der, 1919-1933 at 128 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957). 
6. Donald P. Baker and David S. Broder, Wilder in Hot Water, Wash. Post C1 
(July 4, 1991). 
7. Donald P. Baker, Contrite Wilder Says He Was Misunderstood, Wash. Post A1 
(July 8, 1991). 
8. U.S. Canst., Art. VI,§ 3, cl. 2. 
9. Id. Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 (the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court"). 
10. Id. Art. VI,§ 3, cl. 1. 
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ask the question in a sophisticated way that would be less offen-
sive than what Wilder said, but I don't think he's out of line to 
raise these questions." 11 Thus, this prominent Republican on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee seemed as unfamiliar with the Reli-
gious Test Clause as did Governor Wilder. 
Despite this evident unfamiliarity of some senior politicians 
with the Religious Test Clause, it may be regarded as some 
measure of official toleration of religion that the Supreme Court 
has never been required to decide a case in which a religious test 
was required of a national officeholder. As recently as 1961, 
however, the Court unanimously struck down Maryland's re-
quirement that officeholders declare their belief in the existence 
of God. Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause12 and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 13 added to the Constitution in 1791 through the 
First Amendment, Justice Hugo Black wrote for the Court in 
Torcaso v. Watkins, "We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a 
State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a 
person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. ,,~ 4 Laur-
ence Tribe, writing in his influential treatise several years before 
the Thomas nomination, concluded that, "[a]s a practical mat-
ter," the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses "are disposi-
tive in cases challenging alleged 'religious tests'" such that the 
Religious Test Clause of Article VI "is now of little independent 
significance." 15 
On narrow, legal grounds Professor Tribe's assessment may 
be too sanguine in the case of a judicial nomination, for the con-
11. Baker and Broder, Wilder in Hot Water at C5 (cited in note 6) (quoting Sen. 
Orrin Hatch). 
12. U.S. Cons!., Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free 
exercise (of religion]"). 
13. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"). 
14. 367 U.S. 488,495 (1961) (quoting without citation Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)). In Everson, which was decided under the Establishment Clause, 
the Court further stated: "No person can be punished for entertaining or professing reli-
gious beliefs or disbeliefs .... " 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
15. Sec Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1155 n.l (Foundation 
Press, 2d ed. 1988) (citing Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 n.1; American Communications Ass'n 
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414-15 (1950); Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 
(D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For analysis of the 
Religious Test Clause, see Gerald V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Con-
stitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 674 (1987); see also Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: 
Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43 Viii. L. Rev. 17, 93 (1998); John Witte, 
Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experi-
ment, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 372 (1996); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Relig-
ion in the Constitution, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 83. 
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firmation or rejection of a nominee would not require Congress 
to breach the prohibition that "Congress shall make no law" 
concerning the establishment or free exercise of religion. A con-
firmation vote (like a legislative chaplaincy) is not the enactment 
of a law, and thus religious discrimination in the confirmation or 
rejection of Supreme Court nominees might find a loophole in 
the First Amendment. More generally, the Wilder imbroglio 
demonstrated that the development of jurisprudence on the First 
Amendment's religion clauses should not be taken to obviate an 
explicit constitutional prohibition of the sort that the Religious 
Test Clause embodies. Wilder's comments were consistent with 
Justice Joseph Story's assessment in 1833 that "[t]he framers of 
the constitution .... knew, that bigotry was unceasingly vigilant 
in its stratagems, to secure to itself an exclusive ascendancy over 
the human mind; and that intolerance was ever ready to arm it-
self with all the terrors of the civil power to exterminate those, 
who doubted its dogmas, or resisted its infallibility." 16 
Religion and politics may forever be a volatile mix. In any 
presidential election, the views of a candidate's likely Supreme 
Court nominees provide a lively topic for debate. In current 
times, this controversy is surely due in large measure to the fact 
that nominations to the Court are seen as the vehicle by which 
the law and politics of abortion change in the United States. In 
the 2000 presidential election, for example, Vice President Al 
Gore said, "Not only a woman's right to choose, but a lot of our 
individual rights and civil rights are going to be at risk if the Re-
publican Party controls the majority on the Supreme Court for 
the next 30 or 40 years." 17 In June 2000, the Supreme Court 
struck down, 5-to-4, in Stenberg v. Carhart Nebraska's prohibi-
tion on "partial birth" abortion, and thus produced a new ruling 
on this controversial subject only weeks before the Democratic 
and Republican conventions. 18 President Clinton warned on the 
day of the Carhart ruling that the Supreme Court appointments 
of his successor would determine whether Roe v. Wade "will ei-
ther be maintained or overturned."19 The same day, in the 
closely watched U.S. senatorial race in New York, candidate 
16. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 971, at 
690 (1833) (Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, eds., Carolina Academic Press, 
1987). 
17. Jackie Calmes, Makeup of Supreme Court Becomes a Campaign Issue, Wall St. 
J. A28 (Apr. 4, 2000) (quoting Vice President AI Gore). 
18. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
19. See Press Conference by the President, Weekly Camp. Pres. Doc. (June 28, 
2000). 
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Hillary Rodham Clinton stated: "My position is clear: as a mem-
ber of the United States Senate, I will not vote for a nominee to 
the Supreme Court who would oppose Roe."20 She challenged 
her rival, a Roman Catholic, to take the same pledge.21 The 
following week, the New York Times reported on its front page, 
"Vice President Al Gore, the presumptive Democratic nominee, 
seized on the close vote [in Carhart] to warn that Mr. Bush, if 
elected, would appoint conservative Supreme Court justices hos-
tile to abortion rights. "22 
To be sure, other social issues are swept up in the question 
of Supreme Court nominations, but none has been so polarizing 
since the 1970s as abortion. Abortion remains the festering sore 
of American constitutional discourse?3 Given that cultural and 
political dynamic, the religious views of a Supreme Court nomi-
nee have become a crude proxy for whether the prospective Jus-
tice will vote for or against the perpetuation of a constitutionally 
protected right to an abortion.2 The same crude proxy has been 
20. See Hillary in Agreement with Stenberg v. Carhart; Supreme Court Decision 
Reaffirms Roe v. Wade, June 28, 2000 <http://www.hillary2000.org/news/articles/000628. 
html>. 
21. See id. Ms. Clinton's rival, Representative Rick Lazio, identified himself as a 
Catholic. See <http://congress.org/cgi-binlmember.pl?dir=congressorg2&_member=ny 
02>. 
22. See Jim Yardley, Bush's Choices for Court Seen as Moderates, N.Y. Times 1 
(July 9, 2000); see also Joan Biskupic, A Divided High Court to Revisit Abortion, Wash. 
Post A3 (Apr. 23, 2000) (discussing potential political ramifications of Carhart for 2000 
presidential election). The subject of abortion and its relevance to Supreme Court nomi-
nations was extensively discussed by Vice President Gore and Governor George W. 
Bush during the first televised debate on October 3, 2000. See Debate Transcripts: The 
First 2000 Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (television broadcast, Oct. 3, 2000) (available at 
<www.debates.org/pagesl trans2000a.html> ). 
23. The national discussion of abortion also has affected how religious considera-
tions have influenced the terms of debate on completely different issues. For example, in 
their 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops articulated a Catholic position on nuclear 
weapons and deterrence. As George Weigel has noted in his book on the Catholic per-
spective on war, the debate on abortion informed the bishops' position on nuclear war: 
The bishops urged "reverence for life" throughout American society. Abortion 
blunted our sense of the sacredness of human life. In a country where the un-
born were wantonly killed, "How can we expect people to feel righteous revul-
sion at the act or threat of killing non-combatants in war?" There were differ-
ences between taking life in abortion and taking life in war. Still, the bishops 
pleaded "with all who would work to end the scourge of war to begin by de-
fending life at its most defenseless, the life of the unborn." 
George Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of Ameri-
can Catholic Thought on War and Peace 274 (Oxford U. Press, 1987) (quoting National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Re-
sponse 285, 286, 289 (1983)). 
24. For a similar critique, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Con-
firmation Mess, 105 Yale L.J. 549 (1995) (reviewing Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation 
Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appointments Process (1994)). 
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employed outside the nomination context as well. In 1995, for 
example, parties to an abortion rights case in the Ninth Circuit 
petitioned Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., a Catholic, to 
recuse himself on the grounds that his "fervently-held religious 
beliefs would compromise [his] ability to apply the law."25 Judge 
Noonan denied the petition for recusal on the grounds that it 
would violate the Religious Test Clause.26 Simply put, investiga-
tion of a jurist's personal religious beliefs-a privacy issue if ever 
one existed-has evidently become regarded by many involved 
in the political discourse as socially justifiable in the defense of, 
or in opposition to, those constitutional interpretations that have 
created and extended a woman's right to an abortion. In addi-
tion to presenting the quintessential privacy issue under the 
Constitution, the Religious Test Clause also should be seen as 
the quintessential example of a rule against unconstitutional 
conditions. As the Court observed in Torcaso, "The fact ... that 
a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly 
be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed crite-
ria forbidden by the Constitution."27 
Some political figures have resisted this intrusion into mat-
ters of religious faith. In the Democratic primaries of the 2000 
election, Senator Bill Bradley flatly refused to answer any ques-
tion from reporters concerning his personal religious beliefs.28 
That position, however, is distinguishable from a Supreme Court 
nominee's, as Senator Bradley had already announced his posi-
tion on abortion (he was pro-choice), such that a reporter's in-
quiry into his religious views would be unnecessary to infer his 
likely views on abortion. Few sitting judges, in contrast, would 
publicly express views on a subject that would be so controver-
sial and so likely to generate litigation that might come before 
their courts. To do so might create an appearance of judicial 
partiality. 
In the remainder of this Essay, I explain that, without the 
active vigilance of the Senate, the Religious Test Clause is inca-
pable of protecting religious freedom in the face of the intensity 
25. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Judge Noonan, a former Boalt Hall law professor, is a distinguished scholar on law and 
religion. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Ex-
perience of Religious Freedom (U. of California Press, 1998). 
26. Feminist Women's Health Center, 69 F.3d at 400-01. 
27. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96; sec generally Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining With 
the State (Princeton U. Press, 1995). 
28. Sec Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., He Won't Tell. Should We Care?, N.Y. Times§ 
4, at 19 (Jan. 9, 2000). 
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of efforts to probe the judicial philosophy of Supreme Court 
nominees on the subject of abortion. In Part II, I briefly discuss 
the historical origins of the Religious Test Clause. Despite the 
noble ambitions of that constitutional guarantee, religious intol-
erance was directed only a dozen years later at one of America's 
forefathers of religious liberty, Thomas Jefferson. The guaran-
tee is a fragile one indeed. 
In Part Ill, I examine the relevance of the Religious Test 
Clause to the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court 
Justices and to their personal views about abortion as a theologi-
cal matter. I argue that it is both intractable and improper for 
the Senate to question a nominee about either his religious sect 
or the intensity of his religious devotion. Although I focus on 
the kind of inquiry by which the Senate would violate the Reli-
gious Test Clause, the following analysis would apply equally to 
the president's use of a religious filter to qualify or disqualify 
candidates for judicial nominations according to their likely 
views on abortion as a constitutional matter. A president's use 
of an abortion litmus test that relied on the religious beliefs of a 
prospective judicial nominee would be an illegitimate use of the 
appointment power,29 and, by obviously violating the Religious 
Test Clause (and the religion clauses of the First Amendment), 
would necessarily violate the president's oath to "preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution of the United States. "30 
In Part IV, I explain why, in the absence of punishment im-
posed by the Senate for misconduct by its members, it is unlikely 
that any public sanction or private remedy would be forthcoming 
if a senator violated the prohibition against religious tests in 
connection with a judicial nomination. If the Senate does not 
take that responsibility seriously, our ability as a nation to vindi-
cate the goal of the Religious Test Clause will, as a practical mat-
ter, be limited to the ability of good persons to denounce 
through strictly nonlegal means the bad ethics of any person who 
would violate another's freedom of conscience for political gain. 
29. See U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
30. See id. § 1, cl. 8. The same question arises with respect to the appointment of 
executive branch officials, such as the Attorney General. 
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II. ORIGINS OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST 
RELIGIOUS TESTS 
To any student of American history it should be ironic that 
a Governor of Virginia would be the one to have pronounced 
Judge Thomas's religious beliefs relevant to his qualifications to 
serve on the Supreme Court. Governor Wilder's distant prede-
cessor, Thomas Jefferson, regarded his drafting of the Statute of 
Virginia for Religious Freedom in 1779 to be one of only three 
achievements of his remarkable life worthy of inscription on his 
tombstone.31 The Supreme Court observed in Torcaso: 
It is true that there is much historical precedent for ... laws 
[imposing religious tests]. Indeed, it was largely to escape re-
ligious test oaths and declarations that a great many of the 
early colonists left Europe and came here hoping to worship 
in their own way. It soon developed, however, that many of 
those who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to 
be perfectly willing, when they had the power to do so, to 
force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in confor-
mity with that faith. 32 
After the American Revolution, a number of states still had 
religious tests for officeholders that barred Catholics, Jews, and 
atheists. 33 Jefferson drafted the Statute of Virginia for Religious 
Freedom to provide that "proscribing any citizen as unworthy 
[of] the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of 
being called to the offices of trust and emolument, unless he pro-
fess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him 
injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which in com-
mon with his fellow citizens he has a natural right. "34 Thanks to 
Jefferson's perseverance for more than six years, Virginia en-
acted his draft statute in 1786 and led the way for other states 
similarly to dismantle religious barriers. Georgia abolished reli-
31. See Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jef-
ferson 349 (Ballantine Books, 1987). The two other accomplishments in which Jefferson 
took special pride were the founding of the University of Virginia and the drafting of the 
Declaration of Independence. Id. 
32. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490. 
33. Sec Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 at 172 (Harper & 
Row, 1987). Professor Morris reports: "The disqualification in the Maryland Constitu-
tion barring Jews from public office was not removed until1825; Rhode Island, not until 
the adoption of the state constitution in 1842, and North Carolina not until 1868." Id. at 
358-59 n.28. 
34. Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom (drafted 1779; enacted 1786), re-
printed in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, cds., The Life and Selected Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson 311,312 (Random House, 1944). 
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gious tests for office holding in 1789 and was followed by Penn-
sylvania and South Carolina in 1790, Delaware in 1792, and Ver-
mont in 1793.35 
A. THE DRAFTING AND RATIFICATION OF 
THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE 
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the Framers 
thought that the prohibition against religious tests for national 
officeholders was so elemental that they incorporated it directly 
into the Constitution, even though they did not adopt the Bill of 
Rights, with its two religion clauses in the First Amendment, un-
til four years later.36 Initially, Roger Sherman of Connecticut 
thought that the prohibition on religious tests was unnecessary 
because "the prevailing liberality" would be "a sufficient security 
against such tests."37 But his optimism was challenged by an im-
passioned letter on September 7, 1787, to the Convention from 
Jonas Phillips, a Philadelphia Jew.38 Phillips implored the dele-
gates to delete from any oath of national office the religious test 
then found in Pennsylvania's constitution, which required every 
officeholder to swear that the New Testament was given by di-
vine inspiration.39 He wrote that such a belief would be "abso-
lutly [sic] against the Religious principle of a Jew" and that it 
would be "against his Conscience to take any such oath."40 He 
reminded the Convention that "the Jews have been true and 
faithful whigs, and during the late Contest with England they 
have been foremost in aiding and assisting the States with their 
lifes and fortunes, they have supported the Cause, have bravely 
35. Morris, The Forging of the Union at 172 (cited in note 33). Jefferson's Statute 
of Virginia for Religious Freedom has continued to influence the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947). 
36. U.S. Const., Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'). For an insightful and exhaus-
tive analysis of the history of the Framers' thoughts on religious freedom, particularly the 
influential thinking of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, see Kathleen A. Brady, 
Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can 
Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 
75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 433,440-77 (1999). 
37. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 561 
(W.W. Norton & Co., 1966 ed.). 
38. Letter from Jonas Phillip to the President and Members of the Convention 
(Sept. 7, 1787), reprinted in 3 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787, at 78 (Yale U. Press, 1966 ed.). 
39. ld. 
40. !d. 
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faught and bleed for liberty which they Can not Enjoy."41 Phil-
lips concluded his letter with "prayers ... unto the Lord" that 
"the almighty God of our father Abraham Isaac and Jacob en-
due this Noble Assemb~ with wisdom Judgement and unamity 
[sic] in their Councells." 2 The Framers, of course, did not adopt 
any religious test, let alone one of the sort that Phillips feared. 
But the Framers also did not embrace Sherman's initial assess-
ment that the Religious Test Clause was unnecessary. 
Further commentary by the Framers on the meaning and 
perceived importance of the prohibition against religious tests 
appears in Edmund Randolph's explanation of the new Consti-
tution to the Virginia Convention during the ratification debates 
in 1788: 
The senators and representatives, members of the state legis-
latures, and executive and judicial officers, are bound by oath, 
or affirmation, to support this constitution. This only binds 
them to support it in the exercise of the powers constitution-
ally given it. The exclusion of religious tests is an exception 
from this general provision, with respect to oaths, or affirma-
tions. Although officers, &c. are to swear that they will sup-
port this constitution, yet they are not bound to support one 
mode of worship, or to adhere to one particular sect. It puts 
all sects on the same footing. A man of abilities and charac-
ter, of any sect whatever, may be admitted to any office or 
public trust under the United States.43 
In the style of James Madison's discussion of factions in Federal-
ist No. 1044 and, more specifically in Federalist No. 50,45 
Randolph saw the Religious Test Clause as ensuring that reli-
41. !d. at 79. 
42. !d. 
43. Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), reprinted in 
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention at 310 (cited in note 38). 
44. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke cd., Wesleyan U. 
Press 1961). 
45. The Federalist No. 50 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke, ed., Wesleyan U. Press 
1961). Madison wrote: 
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic of the United States] will be derived 
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so 
many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of 
the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the major-
ity. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for re-
ligious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in 
the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will 
depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to de-
pend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the 
same government. 
!d. at 351-52. 
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gious sects counterbalance one another to prevent the estab-
lishment of a national religion: 
I am a friend to a variety of sects, because they keep one an-
other in order. How many different sects are we composed of 
throughout the United States? How many different sects will 
be in congress? We cannot enumerate the sects that may be in 
congress. And there are so many now in the United States 
that they will prevent the establishment of any one sect in 
prejudice to the rest, and will forever oppose all attempts to 
infringe religious liberty. If such an attempt be made, will not 
the alarm be sounded throughout America? If congress be as 
wicked as we are foretold they will, they would not run the 
risk of exciting the resentment of all, or most of the religious 
sects in America.46 
Randolph made these comments three years before the Bill of 
Rights. His rationale for the Religious Test Clause clearly an-
ticipated both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 
B. RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE TOWARD JEFFERSON'S DEISM 
DURING AND AFTER THE ELECTION OF 1800 
Questions about the religious beliefs of a presidential can-
didate figured prominently only twelve years later. That candi-
date was none other than Thomas Jefferson, the author of the 
Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom. Although raised in 
the Anglican Church, Jefferson by 1800 had embraced deism.47 
As early as 1787 he wrote: 
[R]ead the New Testament. It is the history of a personage 
called Jesus. Keep in your eye the opposite pretensions: 1, of 
those who say he was begotten by God, born of a virgin, sus-
pended and reversed the laws of nature at will, and ascended 
bodily into heaven; and 2, of those who say he was a man of 
illegitimate birth, of a benevolent heart, enthusiastic mind, 
who set out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing 
46. Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), reprinted in 
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention at 310 (cited in note 38); see also Forrest 
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 42 (U. 
Press of Kansas, 1985). 
47. See Cunningham, In Pursuit of Reason at 225 (cited in note 31); Merrill D. Pe-
terson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography 353-54, 956-60 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1970); Dumas Malone, 3 Thomas Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson and The Or-
deal of Liberty 481 (Little, Brown & Co., 1962). In her discussion of Jefferson's religious 
views, Professor Brady notes that Jefferson "often called himself a Unitarian Christian 
rather than a deist." See Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices at 450 n.74 (cited 
in note 36). 
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set out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing 
them, and was punished capitally for sedition, by being gib-
beted, according to the Roman law, which punished the first 
commission of that offence by whipping, and the second by 
exile, or death in furea .... 
Do not be frightened from this inquiry by any fear of its con-
sequences. If it ends in a belief that there is no God, you will 
find incitements to virtue in the comfort and pleasantness you 
feel in its exercise, and the love of others which it will procure 
you. If you find reason to believe there is a God, a conscious-
ness that you are acting under his eye, and that he approves 
you, will be a vast additional incitement; if that there be a fu-
ture state, the hope of a happy existence in that increases the 
appetite to deserve it; if that Jesus was also a God, you will be 
comforted by a belief of his aid and love . . . . Your own rea-
son is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are an-
swerable, not for the rightness, but uprightness of the deci-
. 48 
SlOn. 
It is important to place within historical context Jefferson's ra-
tionalist attempt to restate Christian teachings as a system of 
moral philosophy rather than a religion. 
In Philadelphia in October of 1789, there was convened an-
other kind of constitutional convention. With the American 
Revolution, the Anglican Church in the United States changed 
from the Church of England to the Protestant Episcopal Church 
of the United States. That change also necessitated the revision 
and ratification, in 1789, of The Book of Common Prayer, to re-
flect the disestablishment of the Church of England in the 
United States.49 The Episcopal Church "was in the first place 
drawn to those alterations in the Liturgy which became neces-
sary in the prayers for our Civil Rulers, in consequence of the 
48. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), reprinted in Koch 
and Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 429,432-33 (cited 
in note 34). Some of Jefferson's writings display outright condescension toward religious 
expression. In his travel through France in 1787, for example, he noted that farmers in 
Champagne were clustered in villages rather than dispersed in farmhouses. He therefore 
asked: "Are they thus collected by that dogma of their religion, which makes them be-
lieve, that to keep the Creator in good humor with His own works, they must mumble a 
mass every day?" Memoranda taken on a Journey from Paris into the Southern Parts of 
France, and Northern Italy, in the year 1787 (Mar. 3, 1787), reprinted in id. at 135. 
49. The Ratification of The Book of Common Prayer (1789), reprinted in The Book 
of Common Prayer 8 (Oxford U. Press, 1977 ed.). Apart from Jefferson, the Episcopali-
ans among the nation's founders included George Washington, Patrick Henry, John Jay, 
Robert Morris, John Marshall, and John Randolph. See FrankS. Mead, Handbook of 
Denominations in the United States 131 (Abingdon Press, 6th ed. 1975). 
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Revolution," but the Church emphasized that it was "far from 
intending to depart from the Church of England in any essential 
point of doctrine, discipline, or worship."50 
In 1801, the Episcopal Church further established its Arti-
cles of Religion, which deleted prior Anglican references to the 
King or Queen of England being the head of the Church.51 The 
1801 Articles of Religion also detailed the doctrines of the Epis-
copal Church, such as the Trinity, "the Word or Son of God, 
which was made very Man," and the Resurrection. 52 In addition, 
the Articles of Religion required: "The Nicene Creed, and that 
which is commonly called the Apostle's Creed, ought thoroughly 
to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most cer-
tain warrants of Holy Scripture."53 
The doctrinal precepts of the former Church of England in 
America places in context the controversy over Jefferson's reli-
gious views in the presidential election one year earlier. His 
Federalist opponents in 1800 accused Jefferson, in the words of 
one minister, of "disbelief of the Holy Scriptures" and "rejection 
of the Christian Religion," and they warned that "the voice of 
the nation in calling a deist to the first office must be construed 
into no less than a rebellion against God. "54 The nation, of 
course, did not reject Jefferson on those grounds, though Feder-
alist attacks of this nature continued even while he was in office. 
Jefferson's religious views were intensely rationalist. While 
president, Jefferson in his leisure time conducted research for his 
Philosophy of Jesus, in which he clipped and assembled passages 
from the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John to produce 
a summary of his religious faith and to compare the teachings of 
Jesus with those of Socrates.55 In the words of historian Noble 
Cunningham, this process involved Jefferson's "[e]xcising from 
the Gospels the supernaturalism that he was convinced was 
added by later corruptors of the simple moral teachings of Jesus" 
50. Preface (1789), reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 9, 10-11 (cited in 
note 49). 
51. Articles of Religion, Art. XXXVII (Protestant Episcopal Church in the United 
States of America, Sept. 12, 1801), reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 867,875 
(cited in note 49). 
52. Id., Arts. I, II, IV. 
53. Id., Art. VIII. 
54. Sec Cunningham, In Pursuit of Reason at 225 (cited in note 31) (quoting Wil-
liam Linn, Serious Considerations on the Election of a President: Addressed to the Citizens 
of the United States (Sherman, Mershon & Thomas, 1800)). 
55. Id. at 256. 
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and leaving "what he regarded as Jesus' authentic words."56 In 
his own time, Jefferson's translation of Christian scripture into a 
rational, moral philosophy of Jesus struck many as unconven-
tional if not heretical. Jefferson later wrote to John Adams that, 
"by cutting verse by verse out of the printed book, and arranging 
the matter which is evidently [Jesus') ... which is as easily distin-
guishable as diamonds in a dunghill," Jefferson was able to distill 
"the most sublime and benevolent code of morals which has ever 
been offered to man. "57 Among the elements of Christian doc-
trine that Jefferson rejected-calling them "the imputation of 
imposture, which has resulted from artificial systems, invented 
by ultra-Christian sects, unauthorized by a single word ever ut-
tered by [Jesus]"58 -were "[t]he immaculate conception of Jesus, 
His deification, the creation of the world by Him, His miraculous 
powers, His resurrection and visible ascension, His corporeal 
presence in the Eucharist, the Trinity, original sin, atonement, 
regeneration, election, orders of Hierarchy, etc."59 
The controversial nature of such views of Jesus, particularly 
circa 1800, cannot be overstated. Jefferson's proposition that Je-
sus was not resurrected from the dead- to take the most signifi-
cant example-would strike many students of religion, in 1800 or 
today, as antithetical to the most essential belief within Christi-
anity. Jefferson's system of religious beliefs directly contra-
dicted multiple elements of the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene 
Creed, and other creeds that are fundamental statements of be-
lief for numerous Christian denominations.60 Jefferson once de-
56. Id. at 257. 
57. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 12, 1813)). 
Jefferson expressed his views in virtually identical language in a subsequent letter. See 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819), reprinted in Koch and 
Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 693,694 (cited in note 
34). An earlier summary of Jefferson's analysis of the teachings of Jesus was contained 
in Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), reprinted in id. at 
566. In that letter, Jefferson wrote: 
[My views on religion] are the result of a life of inquiry and reflection, and 
very different from that anti-Christian system imputed to me by those who 
know nothing of my opinions. To the corruptions of Christianity I am, indeed, 
opposed; but not to the genuine precepts of Jesus himself. I am a Christ.ian, in 
the only sense in which he wished any one to be; sincerely attached to h1s doc-
trines, in preference to all others; ascribing to himself every human excellence; 
and believing he never claimed any other. 
!d. at 567 (emphasis in original). 
58. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819) (cited in note 
57). 
59. !d. at 694 n.l. 
60. The Apostles' Creed, reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 53-54 (cited 
in note 49); The Niccne Creed, reprinted in id. at 326-27; Quicunque Vult (The Creed of 
Saint Athanasius), reprinted in id. at 864-65; Definition of the Union of the Divine and 
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dined a request to serve as a godfather on the grounds that he 
"had never sense enough to comprehend the articles of faith of 
the Church," by which he surely meant the Anglican Church.61 
The controversy over Jefferson's religious view in the presi-
dential election of 1800 shows that, despite the existence of the 
Religious Test Clause, Jefferson's adversaries showed little tol-
eration for certain religious views in a leader that were likely to 
offend or frighten traditional Christian believers. Those political 
adversaries attempted scarcely a decade after the ratification of 
the Constitution to make Jefferson's religious beliefs a disquali-
fying factor in the presidential election of 1800. Having survived 
this political adversity to be elected president, Jefferson wrote in 
1803: 
I am moreover averse to the communication of my religious 
tenets to the public; because it would countenance the 
presumption of those who have endeavored to draw upon 
them before that tribunal, and to seduce public opinion to 
erect itself into that inquisition over the rights of conscience, 
which the laws have so justly proscribed. It behooves every 
man who values liberty of conscience for himself, to resist 
invasions of it in the case of others; or their case may, by 
change of circumstances, become his own. It behooves him, 
too, in his own case, to give no example of concession, 
betraying the common right of independent opinion, by 
answering questions of faith, which the laws have left between 
God and himself. 62 
Human Natures in the Person of Christ (Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D.), reprinted in 
id. at 864. The Catechism of the Episcopal Church explains that the Apostles' Creed and 
the Nicene Creed "are statements of our basic beliefs about God." An Outline of the 
Faith Commonly Called the Catechism, reprinted in id. at 845, 851. On the theological 
significance of retaining (within Roman Catholicism if not also within all of Christianity) 
the Apostles' Creed as an original statement of Christian faith, see Karl Rahner, Founda-
tions of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity 449 (William V. Dych, 
trans., Crossroad, 1978). 
A contemporary reminder of the conflict between Jefferson's moral philosophy of 
Jesus and fundamental Christian doctrine is contained in Pope John Paul II's answer to 
the question, "Is Jesus the Son of God?" See His Holiness John Paul II, Crossing the 
Threshold of Hope 42-49 (Knopf, 1994). Pope John Paul II observes, "Christ does not 
resemble Muhammad or Socrates or Buddha." Id. at 45. "The uniqueness of Christ," he 
explains, "(is] indicated by Peter's words at Caesarea Philippi, is ... expressed by the 
Creed. I d. at 45-46. 
61. Quoted in Willard Sterne Randall, Thomas Jefferson: A Life 85 (Henry Holt & 
Co., 1993). 
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), reprinted in 
Koch and Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 567 (cited in 
note 57). 
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It is not difficult to imagine that two centuries later, in a consid-
erably more secular America, a candidate or nominee for high 
public office in the federal government who held as intense or as 
controversial religious views as Jefferson did in 1800 would be 
the subject of public speculation and innuendo about the prob-
able influence of his religious beliefs on the discharge of his pub-
lic duties. 
III. RELIGIOUS TESTING OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES 
Because of the controversy that abortion has engendered in 
American public life since at least the Supreme Court's decision 
in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut63 and Pope Paul VI's 1968 en-
cyclical on contraception,64 it would be naive to believe that the 
imbroglio over Governor Wilder's 1991 comments about the 
nomination of Justice Thomas will not repeat itself in the case of 
some future Supreme Court nominee, if perhaps in more dis-
creet terms. It is therefore useful to scrutinize more closely the 
kind of information that religious questioning of Supreme Court 
nominees would be intended to elicit and to consider the ramifi-
cations of such questions. Was it Governor Wilder's understand-
ing of Judge Thomas's religious devotion that prompted the 
Governor's indelicate remarks? Or was it Judge Thomas's strict 
schooling in Catholicism per se? 
Either prospect leads to an inappropriate line of questions 
to pose to a judicial nominee. Contrary to what Senator Hatch's 
remarks in 1991 might have suggested, the Senate would not 
avoid violating the Religious Test Clause by questioning a Su-
preme Court nominee's religious beliefs "in a sophisticated way 
that would be less offensive"65 than Governor Wilder's state-
ments about the need to question Judge Thomas concerning the 
extent of his allegiance to the Pope. If anything, more "sophisti-
cated" and "less offensive" religious testing of Supreme Court 
nominees would draw the Senate more deeply into precisely the 
territory that the Religious Test Clause forbade the government 
to enter. 
There is additionally a separation of powers issue here. If 
the purpose of religious testing is to probe a nominee's likely 
63. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
64. Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Humane Vitae (July 25, 1968). 
65. Baker and Broder, Wilder in Hot Water at C5 (cited in note 6) (quoting Sen. 
Orrin Hatch). 
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vote on a particularly controversial constitutional question, such 
as a legal proposition concerning abortion rights, the nominee 
would in effect be asked by the Senate (or by the president, in 
screening the nominee) to render an advisory opinion, in viola-
tion of the "case or controversy" limitation on judicial power 
under Article III.66 If this argument is correct, it would of course 
sweep more broadly than simply a prohibition on senatorial 
questioning of judicial nominees on matters of religion. 67 One 
possibility is that the Senate is not constitutionally forbidden to 
elicit advisory opinions by posing questions about religious be-
lief, but neither is a nominee constitutionally required to answer 
them. This interpretation, however, is hardly satisfactory if its 
practical effect is to discourage entire denominations of religious 
believers from entering public service. As I argue below, a 
nominee suffers a constitutional indignity simply upon being 
questioned about his religious convictions by those possessing 
the authority to confirm him to public office. Although this 
question of advisory opinions is an interesting and subtle one, it 
would lead the analysis away from the principle focus of this Es-
say, the Religious Test Clause. 
Returning then to the infirmity of religious testing of judi-
cial nominees under the Religious Test Clause, consider now the 
difficulty of senatorial unease over a nominee's religious sect 
and over a nominee's religious devotion. 
A. OBJECTION TO RELIGIOUS SECT 
Governor Wilder might have been concerned not with 
Judge Thomas' religious devotion per se, but with the possibility 
that his devotion to Catholic teachings on the specific subject of 
abortion would predispose him as a Justice of the Supreme 
Court to vote to uphold statutory regulations on the availability 
of abortion-as Justice Thomas in fact did during his first year 
on the Court68 -or even to vote to overrule Roe v. Wade. 69 
66. See U.S. Canst., Art. III,§ 2. 
67. See generally Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997); Alabama State Fed. of 
Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,461 (1945). 
68. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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1. How Does the Pope Instruct Catholics-and Others-on 
Abortion? 
Given the intensity of discussion of whether a particular Su-
preme Court nominee would or would not be in the pocket of 
the Pope, it is useful to interrupt the debate by clarifying first 
how the Pope has actually instructed Catholics on the subject of 
abortion. One senses that much of the debate occurs at a level 
of what proponents and opponents of abortion rights think the 
Pope has said on the subject. Pope John Paul II has provided an 
accessible summary of his teaching in his essay, The Defense of 
Every Life, published in his 1994 book.70 
Pope John Paul II begins by positing that "the right to life is 
the fundamental right" and "means the right to be born and then 
continue to live until one's natural end: 'As long as I live, I have 
the right to live. "'71 The application of this principle to the case 
of abortion presents, in the Pope's assessment, "a particularly 
delicate yet clear problem"72 : 
The legalization of the termination of pregnancy is none other 
than the authorization given to an adult, with the approval of 
an established law, to take the lives of children yet unborn 
and thus incapable of defending themselves. It is difficult to 
imagine a more unjust situation, and it is very difficult to speak 
of obsession in a matter such as this, where we are dealing with 
a fundamental imperative of every good conscience-the de-
fense of the right to life of an innocent and defenseless human 
b . 73 em g. 
Pope John Paul II rejects the logic and rhetoric of "choice." He 
disputes that "the woman should have the right to choose be-
tween giving life or taking it away from the unborn child" be-
cause the latter alternative entails "a clear moral evil" of violat-
ing the commandment against killing another human being.74 
Pope John Paul II sees no exception to this conclusion.75 His pre-
scription is for "radical solidarity with the woman," through 
counseling centers and houses for teenage mothers, to help the 
70. See Crossing the Threshold of Hope at 204-11 (cited in note 60). A theologi-
cally exhaustive presentation of Pope John Paul's teaching on abortion appeared in his 
encyclical letter issued the following year. See John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evan-
gelium Vitae (Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae]. 
71. See His Holiness John Paull/ at 204-05 (cited in note 60) (emphasis in original). 
72. ld. at 205. 
73. Id. (emphasis in original). 
74. Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at 210-11. 
75. Id. at 205-06. 
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mother bear her child.76 "It is not right to leave her alone."77 The 
firmness of Pope John Paul Il's position reflects his assessment 
that abortion is "a problem of tremendous importance" with 
broad ramifications: "We cannot afford forms of permissiveness 
that would lead directly to the trampling of human rights, and 
also to the complete destruction of values which are fundamen-
tal not onl1s for the lives of individuals and families but for soci-
ety itself." 8 
These are hard words. It is not possible to reconcile Pope 
John Paul ll's instructions on abortion with statutes or court de-
cisions that permit abortion on demand. But the Pope's denun-
ciation of abortion is not limited to criticizing the logic and 
rhetoric of the pro-choice position. He directly condemns as a 
matter of religious doctrine the state's role in the legalization of 
abortion on demand. This condemnation is even more sustained 
in the Pope's official pronouncements, and even more a direct 
confrontation to the authority of civil law. 
In his 1995 encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae, Pope John 
Paul II distinguishes between civil law and the moral law: "One 
of the specific characteristics of present-day attacks on human 
life ... consists in the trend to demand a legal justification for 
them, as if they were rights upon which the State, at least under 
certain conditions, must acknowledge as belonging to citizens."79 
In turn, the Pope argues, such legal justifications derive from the 
contemporary understanding of democracy. He writes that, "in 
the democratic culture of our time it is commonly held that the 
legal system of any society should limit itself to taking account of 
and accepting the convictions of the majority."80 This orientation 
of the legal system to satisfy majority preferences leads, in Pope 
John Paul ll's view, to a moral relativism in which personal re-
sponsibility in the matter of preserving human life is abandoned: 
[W]e have what appear to be two diametrically opposed ten-
dencies. On the one hand, individuals claim for themselves in 
the moral sphere the most complete freedom of choice and 
demand that the State should not adopt or impose any ethical 
position but limit itself to guaranteeing maximum space for 
the freedom of each individual, with the sole limitation of not 
infringing on the freedom and rights of any other citizen. On 
76. Id. at 207. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). 
79. Sec Evangelium Vitae at '168 (cited in note 70) (emphasis in original). 
80. Sec id. at 69. 
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the other hand, it is held that, in the exercise of public and 
professional duties, respect for other people's freedom of 
choice requires that each one should set aside his or her own 
convictions in order to satisfy every demand of the citizens 
which is recognized and guaranteed by law; in carrying out 
one's duties the only moral criterion should be what is laid 
down by the law itself. Individual responsibility is thus turned 
over to the civil law, with a renouncing of personal conscience, 
at least in the public sphere. 81 
In a manner reminiscent of the countermajoritarian rationale for 
judicial review in American constitutional law, Pope John Paul 
II sees the will of the majority as being subject to a higher, moral 
constraint: 
Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a sub-
stitute for morality or a panacea for immorality. Fundamen-
tally, democracy is a "system" and as such is a means and not 
an end. Its "moral" value is not automatic, but depends on 
conformity to the moral law to which it, like every other form 
of human behaviour, must be subject: in other words, its mo-
rality depends on the morality of the ends which it pursues 
and of the means which it employs .... [T]he value of democ-
racy stands or falls with the values which it embodies and 
82 promotes. 
Pope John Paul II argues that the values embodied in and pro-
moted by a democracy, "such as the dignity of every human per-
son,"83 have an objective origin in natural law, which he believes 
must motivate civil law also: 
The basis of these values cannot be provisional and change-
able "majority" opinions, but only the acknowledgment of an 
objective moral law which, as the "natural law" written in the 
human heart, is the obligatory point of reference for civil law 
itself. If, as a result of a tragic obscuring of the collective con-
science, an attitude of scepticism were to succeed in bringing 
into question even the fundamental principles of the moral 
law, the democratic system itself would be shaken in its foun-
dations, and would be reduced to a mere mechanism for regu-
81. See id. (emphasis added). For a similar critique of the tendency of Congress to 
debate the usc of military force in excessively legalistic terms that tend to obscure what I 
have called the "moral visibility of collective action," see J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare 
War, 41 Duke L.J. 27 (1991). 
82. See Evangelium Vitae at 70 (cited in note 70). 
83. See id. 
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lating different and opposing interests on a purely empirical 
basis.84 
29 
The Pope therefore urges nations to reconcile their civil laws 
with morallaw.85 
Pope John Paul Il's exhortation in this regard invokes the 
same notions of inalienable rights found in the Declaration of 
Independence and of fundamental rights of the Supreme Court's 
late twentieth-century jurisprudence, though obviously to differ-
ent effect than the Court's creation and extension of a constitu-
tional right to abortion on demand: 
It is ... urgently necessary, for the future of society and the 
development of a sound democracy, to rediscover those es-
sential and innate human and moral values which flow from 
the very truth of the human being and express and safeguard 
the dignity of the person: values which no individual, no ma-
jority and no State can ever create, modify or destroy, but 
must only acknowledge, respect and promote. 
Consequently there is a need to recover the basic elements 
of a vision of the relationship between civil law and moral law, 
which are put forward by the Church, but which are also part 
of the patrimony of the great juridical traditions of humanity. 
[C]ivil law must ensure that all members of society enjoy 
respect for certain fundamental rights which innately belong 
to the person, rights which every positive law must recognize 
and guarantee. First and fundamental among these is the in-
violable right to life of every innocent human being. While 
public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to 
something which-were it prohibited-would cause more se-
rious harm, it can never presume to legitimize as a right of in-
dividuals-even if they are the majority of the members of so-
ciety-an offence against other persons caused by the 
disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life. The 
legal toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way 
claim to be based on respect for the conscience of others, pre-
cisely because society has the right and the duty to protect it-
84. See id. 
85. One person commenting on a draft of this Essay remarked of this passage by 
Pope John Paul II: "It seems to me that the Pope is getting dangerously close to the in-
vestiture conflicts of the middle ages where the Pope's predecessors succeeded for a time 
in placing the Church above the State. Popes invested kings with their secular authority. 
If we follow the Pope's line of reasoning, would we not be moving to a modern version of 
investiture?" 
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self against the abuses which can occur in the name of con-
science and under the pretext of freedom. 86 
In essence, Pope John Paul II goes toe to toe with secular court 
decisions that base abortion rights on a notion of a fundamental 
human right. The Pope defends his position by citing the Catho-
lic Church's statements on human rights, as well as Saint Thomas 
Aquinas's view that an unjust law violates natural law and thus is 
not legitimate law.87 Pope John Paul II therefore rejects the le-
gitimacy of civil law that permits abortion: "Disregard for the 
right to life, precisely because it leads to the killing of the person 
whom society exists to serve, is what most directly conflicts with 
the possibility of achieving the common good. Consequently, a 
civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very 
fact to be a true, morally binding civillaw."88 
The Pope states plainly that abortion is a "crime[]which no 
human law can claim to legitimize," and he counsels that 
" [ t ]here is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead 
there is a grave and clear obligation to oppose them by conscien-
tious objection." 89 His scriptural support for such conscientious 
objection includes the account in Exodus of the Jews in captivity 
in Egypt: 
In the Old Testament, precisely in regard to threats against 
life, we find a significant example of resistance to the unjust 
command of those in authority. After Pharaoh ordered the 
killing of all newborn males, the Hebrew midwives refused. 
"They did not do as the king of Egypt commanded them, but 
let the male children live." But the ultimate reason for their 
action should be noted: "the midwives feared God." It is pre-
cisely from obedience to God-to whom alone is due that fear 
which is acknowledgment of his absolute sovereignty-that 
the strength and the courage to resist unjust human laws are 
born."90 
Although Pope John Paul II gives specific direction to legis-
lators who must vote on legislation regulating abortion,91 he has 
no specific words for judges who will review such legislation. He 
notes, in a sentence reminiscent of Jefferson, that the "right to 
86. See id. 'I 71 (emphasis in original). 
87. See id. '1'1 71-72. 
88. Sec id. 'I 72. 
89. See id. 'I 73 (emphasis in original). 
90. See id. (quoting Exodus 1:17) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
91. See id. 
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demand not to be forced to take part in morally evil actions .... 
may require the sacrifice of prestigious professional positions or 
the relinquishing of reasonable hopes of career advancement. "92 
A Catholic judge, therefore, is left to take guidance from the fol-
lowing general statement by the Pope on conscientious objec-
tion: 
Christians, like all people of good will, are called upon under 
grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally in 
practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are con-
trary to God's law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is 
never licit to cooperate formally in evil. Such cooperation oc-
curs when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it 
takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct par-
ticipation in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in 
the immoral intention of the person committing it. This co-
operation can never be justified either by invoking respect for 
the freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that civil law 
permits it or requires it. Each individual in fact has moral re-
sponsibility for the acts which he personally performs; no one 
can be exempted from this responsibility, and on the basis of 
it everyone will be judged by God himself.93 
Thus, the Pope's teaching on abortion is judgmental and un-
equivocal. In his exhaustive biography of the Pope, George 
Weigel calls the language of Evangelium Vitae "unsparing" in its 
criticism of the legitimation of abortion by law-governed democ-
racies.94 The Pope's condemnation of abortion admits no excep-
tions and is not qualified in lawyerly terms of which trimester is 
permissible for the procedure or whether parental notification is 
required. According to Pope John Paul II, the state's role in le-
gitimizing abortion is contrary to natural law and moral teaching. 
The civil law conferring abortion rights therefore lacks legiti-
mate authority in his view. The Pope's absolute opposition to 
abortion rests on a fundamental right to life and a duty not to 
violate one of the Ten Commandments given to Moses on 
Mount Sinai.95 
92. Sec id. 'I 74. 
93. Sec id. 
94. Sec George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paulll757 
(Harper Collins, 1999). 
95. Sec Crossing the Threshold of Hope at 210 (cited in note 60). Michael Novak 
reminds me that the Pope fortifies his argument through faith by drawing upon reason 
also: Scientific advances enable one to say that a fetus is life and, moreover, is a human 
life that is uniquely distinct in a genetic sense from the mother's human life. See note 
115. 
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2. How Would the Senate Interrogate a Catholic Nominee on 
His Adherence to the Pope's Instructions on Abortion? 
To justify religious interrogation of a nominee because he is 
a Catholic, and thus would be presumed to obey the Pope's in-
structions on matters such as abortion, would be to invite the 
Senate to trespass onto precisely the terrain that the Framers 
forbade. Suppose that members of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee asked a judicial nominee questions like, "Is it your reli-
gious belief that life begins at conception?" and "Does your re-
ligion consider abortion to be murder?" The rather plain 
implication of such questions would be that affirmative answers 
would result in certain Senators voting either for or against the 
nominee's confirmation. Other questions might seem less in-
flammatory, more dryly academic: "Do you agree with para-
graph 72 of Pope John Paul Il's encyclical Evangelium Vitae that 
it is necessary for the civil law to conform with moral law?" It 
does not require a particularly imaginative sequence of questions 
of this sort to lead the nominee to within an inch of the conclud-
ing proposition in a statement of religious doctrine, such as 
Evangelium Vitae. 
Jefferson wrote in the Statute of Virginia for Religious 
Freedom that testing for politically appealing religious beliefs 
would "corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to 
encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honors and 
emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to 
it."96 As a student of the Gospel, Jefferson surely knew that, of 
the twelve Disciples present at the Last Supper, one could be 
made by the fear of the civil authority to deny three times in a 
single night ever knowing Jesus, and another could be bribed 
into betraying him.97 If Jefferson was correct in his assessment 
of the temptation presented by "worldly honors and emolu-
ments," then one could hardly imagine in the modern American 
political sphere a better example of such bribery of conscience 
than a senator's tacit (if not explicit) offer to support a nomi-
nee's lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court if he will re-
nounce publicly those contentious tenets of his religion that an-
noy a particular political faction whose influence the senator 
cannot ignore. The suspicion with which the Constitution views 
96. Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom at 312 (cited in note 34). 
97. See, e.g., Matthew 26:69-75 (denial by Peter of any knowledge of Jesus); id. at 
26:47-56 (betrayal of Jesus by Judas lscariot). 
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such questioning should be a safeguard for individual liberty that 
pro-choice and pro-life groups both applaud with equal gusto. 
B. OBJECTION TO RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 
There is an alternative interpretation of Governor Wilder's 
remarks that is less offensive to Catholicism as a religious sect, 
but it is an interpretation that nonetheless reveals other unpalat-
able facets of religious tests. Governor Wilder's reference to 
Judge Thomas' "very devout" religious beliefs could be under-
stood to imply that there should be a sliding scale of senatorial 
scrutiny of judicial nominees that depends on the perceived 
moderation or extremity of each nominee's particular religious 
beliefs. Someone with "very devout" beliefs presumably must 
be more closely scrutinized than someone with tepid religious 
beliefs or no religious beliefs at all. After all, one could argue, 
the very devout nominee might be a religious fanatic. 98 
There are four problems with the Senate's attempting to 
scrutinize the intensity of a nominee's religious devotion. Those 
problems are insuperable and thus merely underscore the wis-
dom and importance of the Religious Test Clause as an absolute 
bar to such inquiry. 
1. The Presumption That Justices Cannot Set Aside 
Personal Beliefs 
Scrutiny of a nominee's religious devotion tacitly presumes 
that a Justice of the Supreme Court will decide cases in accor-
dance with his personal religious beliefs rather than the Consti-
tution of the United States that he has sworn to support.99 This 
presumption discards the rather elemental principle that our na-
tion at least aspires to have a Judiciary obedient to the rule of 
law. Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit summarized the diffi-
culty of such thinking in his 1995 denial of a petition that he 
recuse himself from an abortion case because of his Catholicism: 
It is a matter of public knowledge that the Catholic Church, of 
which I am a member, holds that the deliberate termination of 
a normal pregnancy is a sin, that is, an offense against God 
and against neighbor. Orthodox Judaism also holds that in 
most instances abortion is a grave offense against God. The 
98. This theme is explored more generally in Carter, The Culture of Disbelief(cited 
in note 2). 
99. U.S. Canst., Art. VI,§ 3, cl. 2. 
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints proscribes abor-
tion as normally sinful. These are only three of many reli-
gious bodies whose teaching on the usual incompatibility of 
abortion with the requirements of religious morality would 
imply that the plaintiffs' business [the provision of abortions] 
is disfavored by their adherents. If religious beliefs are the 
criterion of judicial capacity in abortion-related cases, many 
persons with religious convictions must be disqualified from 
hearing them. In particular, I should have disqualified myself 
from hearing or writing Koppes v. Johnston, IJ!'holding the 
constitutional rights of an advocate of abortion. 1 
It is not a satisfactory response, Judge Noonan reasoned, to say 
that abortion cases are special and thus deserve extraordinary 
rules of recusal that turn on a judge's religious beliefs: 
The plaintiffs may object that the disqualification applies only 
to cases involving abortion; they are not disqualifying Catho-
lics, Jews, Mormons and others from all judicial office. This 
distinction ... [is] unworkable. The plaintiffs are contending 
that judges of these denominations cannot function in a broad 
class of cases that have arisen frequently in the last quarter of 
a century. The plaintiffs seek to qualify the office of federal 
judge with a proviso: no judge with religious beliefs condemn-
ing abortion may function in abortion cases. The sphere of 
action of these judges is limited and reduced. The proviso ef-
fectively imposes a religious test on the federal judiciary. 101 
To Judge Noonan's assessment one may add that the tacit pre-
sumption that a jurist will decide a case on the basis of his per-
sonal religious beliefs rather than on the basis of the law pro-
vides no rationale for why a jurist's religion should compromise 
his objectivity more than his politics or gender or race would. 
Surely we would not disqualify nominees to the Court because 
they were devout Democrats or Republicans at some point in 
their careers. Surely we would not disqualify a gay man from 
serving on the Court in the belief that his sexual orientation, 
rather than his judicial philosophy, would determine how he 
would rule on Say marriage or a case that ~ight o~errule Bo~ers 
v. Hardwick. 1 Surely we would not dtsquahfy an Afncan 
American from serving on the Court because, as an attorney ear-
100. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(citation omitted; citing 850 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
101. Id. at 400-01. 
102. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
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lier in her career, she advocated principles of affirmative action 
that the Court considered and rejected. 
Similarly, it is inappropriate to refer to "the Jewish seat" on 
the Court, for that phrase implies that Jews as a religious and 
ethnic group have a different perspective on constitutional inter-
pretation from that of gentiles. Such thinking harkens back to 
stereotypes from an earlier era. Six years after Louis Brandeis's 
appointment to the Supreme Court by President Woodrow Wil-
son in 1916/03 Harvard's president proposed the imposition of a 
quota on the admission of Jews, until public indignation-
including a powerful letter from alumnus Learned Hand-
shamed the university into backing down. 104 It is no more appro-
priate to speak today of "the Jewish seat" on the Court being ei-
ther vacant or occupied, for it is incompatible with the Religious 
Test Clause (as well as the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment) for any number of seats on the Court to be re-
garded as reserved for, or excluded from, any particular religious 
group. 
2. The Impracticality and Impropriety of Assessing the 
Intensity of Religious Devotion 
Inquiry into a nominee's religious devotion would require 
the Senate not simply to identify his religious beliefs, but to 
gauge their intensity, which surely would transform the inquiry 
from the presumptuous to the farcical. In the analogous situa-
tion of a petition for recusal, Judge Noonan explained the im-
practicality and impropriety of measuring the intensity of a ju-
rist's religious devotion: 
True, the plaintiffs qualify my beliefs as "fervently-held" as if 
to distinguish my beliefs from those that might be lukewarmly 
maintained. A moment's consideration shows that the dis-
tinction is not workable. The question is whether incapacitat-
ing prejudice flows from religious belief. The question is to 
be judged objectively as a reasonable person with knowledge 
of all the facts would judge. As long as a person holds the 
creed of one of the religious bodies condemning abortion as 
sinful he must be accounted unfit to judge a case involving 
abortion; the application of an objective, reasonable-person 
103. See Philippa Strumm, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People (Harvard U. 
Press, 1984); Howard M. Sachar, A History of the Jews in America (Alfred A. Knopf, 
1992). 
104. See Learned Hand, Christians and Jews (1922), in The Spirit of Liberty 20 (U. of 
Chicago Press, 3d ed. 1960). 
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standard leads inexorably to this conclusion if the plaintiff's 
contention is supportable. No thermometer exists for measur-
ing the heatedness of a religious belief objectively. Either re-
ligious belief disqualifies or it does not. Under [the Religious 
Test Clause of] Article VI it does not. 105 
The case of Justice Thomas underscores the impracticality of the 
Senate's attempting to supply that religious "thermometer." 
Justice Thomas was educated by nuns in a parochial school and 
studied in the seminary briefly, yet he divorced and remarried 
and reportedly was attending an Episcopal church when nomi-
nated to the Supreme Court. 106 The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, a body whose prestige does not derive from its reputation 
for theological insight, surely would stray outside its institutional 
competence to inquire, before a television audience of millions, 
into a Supreme Court nominee's adherence to or deviation from 
the tenets of Roman Catholicism. The spectacle of the Senate's 
determining whether a nominee is a devout or a lapsed Catholic 
would, of course, never occur. To avoid personal embarrass-
ment and political injury, senators quite understandably would 
not care to reveal, in the process of questioning a Supreme Court 
nominee, their own possibly limited understandings of religious 
doctrine. 
3. Inducing a Safe Homogeneity of Religious Belief and 
Expression 
Even if the Senate were competent to gauge a nominees' re-
ligious devotion, such scrutiny would encourage a safe homoge-
neity in the religious beliefs and expressions of those who aspire 
to high public office. This danger is another dimension of J effer-
son's admonition that religious tests imposed by government 
would "corrugt the principles of that very religion it is meant to 
encourage."1 As the Supreme Court noted in Torcaso, reli-
gious tests, even if constitutional, would be counterproductive to 
the extent that they created a disincentive for honest persons to 
aspire to public office. The Court observed that Oliver Ells-
worth, "a member of the Federal Constitutional Convention and 
later Chief Justice of this Court," published a letter in December 
1787 denouncing religious test oaths on the grounds that "test-
laws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because 
105. Feminist Women's Health Center, 69 F.3d at 400 (citation omitted). 
106. In the Pocket of the Pope?, Wash. Post A18 (July 6, 1991). 
107. Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom at 312 (cited in note 34). 
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men of loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade 
them. If they exclude any persons, it will be honest men, men of 
principle, who will rather suffer an i~ury, than act contrary to 
the dictates of their consciences .... " 1 8 
One must seriously question whether a devout Amish Men-
nonite or Mormon or Hasidic Jew or Christian Scientist ever 
would be willing to endure the public humiliation of being made 
to explain under oath to the Senate Judiciary Committee the 
reasons why his adherence to a level of religious devotion that 
substantially exceeds the rather secular American norm would 
pose no threat to his objectivity as a Justice of the Supreme 
Court. For example, would an Orthodox Jew who refuses to eat 
swordfish on the grounds that it has no scales109 be able to apply 
"local community standards" to an obscenity case originating in 
a socially liberal city, such as Berkeley, California or Cambridge, 
Massachusetts? What could he say to prove to the Senate that 
the orthodoxy of his religious beliefs would not predispose him 
in a case that required applications of a legal standard that em-
bodies a more popular or more homogeneous social attitude? 
This argument concerning popular distrust of uncommon reli-
gious belief and expression would apply with even greater force 
to Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Baha'is, and followers of 
other religions with which most Americans may be personally 
unfamiliar. As the Court in Torcaso noted, in the debate of the 
North Carolina Convention on the adoption of the U.S. Consti-
tution, James Iredell, "later a Justice of this Court," said of the 
Religious Test Clause: "It is objected that the people of America 
may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all, 
and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. 
But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking 
away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so 
warmly contend for?" 110 
Justice Story wrote in 1833 that the lesson to be drawn from 
the use of religious tests in England before the American Revo-
lution was that, in matters of religious belief, "the pains and 
108. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 494 n.9 (quoting Paul Leicester Ford, Essays on the Consti-
tution of the United States Published During Its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788 at 
170 (Historical Printing Club, 1892)). 
109. According to Jewish dietary laws, "only fish that have fins and scales are per-
mitted to be eaten." Shlomo Pesach Toperoff, The Animal Kingdom in Jewish Thought 
71 (Jason Aronson Inc., 1995) (citing Leviticus 11:9; Deuteronomy 14:9). 
110. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.lO (quoting Jonathan Elliot, 4 Debates in the Several 
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 194 (1836-45)). 
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penalties of non-conformity" are "enforced with a stern and vin-
dictive jealously." 111 It is worth remembering that, more than a 
decade after Justice Story wrote these words, and more than half 
a century after the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, the Mormons fled Illinois for the land that was to be 
named Utah when, following years of violence and intimidation 
against the members of this religious sect, their prophet, Joseph 
Smith, was murdered in jail by a mob along with Hyrum Smith, 
the church's patriarch. 112 Although Protestants and Catholics do 
not wage holy wars against one another in modern America, 
even genteel expressions of intolerance-the danger inherent in 
the "sophisticated" and "less offensive" questions that Senator 
Hatch envisioned in 1991-may nonetheless succeed in intimi-
dating those with heterogeneous religious beliefs from fully par-
ticipating in civil society. 
4. Compelling Rational Explanations for Beliefs, 
Through Faith, in Divine Mysteries 
A recurrent theme in both the Old Testament and New Tes-
tament is the difference between belief through faith and belief 
through reason. 113 Indeed, Pope John Paul II issued an encycli-
calletter on faith and reason in 1998.114 Inquiry into a nominee's 
religious devotion would inject the rationalism of which lawyers 
are so enamored into questions that are inherently insusceptible 
to rational explanation. It is hard to imagine, for example, that 
pro-choice Catholics who, for purposes of the abortion debate, 
rejected on scientific grounds that human life begins at concep-
tion would not simultaneously take offense if told that their re-
jection of that proposition through rational reasoning made all 
111. See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution§ 971 at 691 (cited in note 16). 
112. See, e.g., Mead, Handbook of Denominations at 98 (cited in note 49); Davis Bit-
ton and Leonard J. Arrington, The Mormons and Their Historians 7 (U. of Utah Press, 
1988). 
113. A classic example from the New Testament is the story of Jesus' healing of the 
servant of the Roman centurion at Capernaum in Galilee. See Luke 7:1-10. The centu-
rion had treated the Jewish elders well and had even helped them to build a synagogue. 
So, when the centurion's servant fell gravely ill, the elders came to Jesus to implore him 
to go to the centurion's home to heal the servant. As Jesus approached the h~use, the 
centurion emerged and told Jesus that he was not worthy to have Jesus enter h1s home. 
The centurion explained that, as a man accustomed to authority, he knew that Jesus 
needed only to will that the servant be healed for it to happen. Jesus was amazed and 
told those following him that he had not encountered anyone with greater faith, even in 
Israel. The centurion returned to his house, where the servant emerged, cured. 
114. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio (1998). 
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the more inconsistent their continued belief through faith that 
the Virgin Mary immaculately conceived the Son of God. 
I do not mean to suggest that a Catholic, employing reason 
rather than faith, could only conclude that human life begins at 
some moment after conception.115 Rather, the point here is that 
belief through faith in the Creation, the Immaculate Conception, 
the Trinity, the Resurrection, and the Second Coming does not 
begin with, rel~ on, and end with an epistemological foundation 
in rationalism. 16 In the language of economics, reason is not a 
substitute for faith; reason may instead be a complement to faith. 
The Cambridge theoretical physicist and theologian John Polk-
inghorne has argued this thesis rigorously in several penetrating 
books. 117 Similarly, in private conversations Michael Novak has 
conveyed this point with the metaphor that reason can provide 
the trellis upon which climbs the living rose, faith. 
Religion addresses the transcendent, and for that reason it 
would be specious and self-important for those in political life to 
scrutinize a Supreme Court nominee's adherence to religious 
doctrines according to principles of rational human thought. In-
deed, to do so would be tantamount to the establishment of Jef-
fersonian deism as the state religion. As the Episcopal Church 
stated in its Articles of Religion, issued in 1801, "The Power of 
the Civil Magistrate extendeth to all men, as well Clergy as La-
ity, in all things temporal; but hath no authority in things purely 
spiritual. " 118 In strikingly similar language, a delegate to the 
North Carolina Convention on the adoption of the U.S. Consti-
tution stated that the Religious Test Clause "leaves religion on 
the solid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any 
connection with temporal authority." 119 If divine mysteries are 
115. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Be-
gins at Conception", 43 Stan. L. Rev. 599, 625 (1991) (proposition that life begins at 
conception is "virtually unintelligible"), with Robert P. George, Public Reason and 
Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 Yale L.J. 2475 (1997) (refuting 
Professor Rubenfeld). 
116. Sec, e.g., Karl Rahner, The Trinity 46 (Joseph Donceel, trans., Crossroad Pub-
lishing Co., 1970) ("It is evident that the doctrine of the Trinity must always remain 
aware of its mysterious character, which belongs to the divine reality, insofar at least as 
we are concerned, now and forever, hence also in the blessed vision. For even in the vi-
sion God remains forever incomprehensible."). 
117. See, e.g., John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (Yale U. Press, 
1998); John Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction (Fortress Press, 1998). 
118. See Articles of Religion, Art. XXXVII (Protestant Episcopal Church in the 
United States of America, Sept. 12, 1801 ), reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 
867,875 (cited in note 49). 
119. See Elliot, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution at 200 (cited in note 110), cited in Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.10. 
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indeed the work of a supreme being, then those mysteries hardly 
need to stoop to the limits of rational human understanding. 
IV. IS THERE ANY EFFECTIVE PRIVATE REMEDY 
OR PUBLIC SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE 
RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE? 
If we ascribe legal meaning to each clause of the Constitu-
tion and exclude the possibility that entire clauses of that docu-
ment are merely hortatory bromides for good government, then 
we must ask: What private remedy would be available to the 
nominee to public office who had been subjected to a religious 
test? What public sanctions would lie against government offi-
cials who subjected a nominee to the religious test? The answers 
are surprising. The nominee has no effective private remedy. 
For a senator violating the Religious Test Clause, the only effec-
tive public sanction would be that which the Constitution em-
powers the Senate to impose under its internal rules for punish-
ing misconduct. There is not likely to be any judicially 
enforceable public sanction against a senator who violates the 
Religious Test Clause. 
A. THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE PRIVATE REMEDY 
FOR THE NOMINEE FOR THE VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS 
UNDER THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE 
"The very essence of civil liberty," said the Supreme Court 
in Marbury v. Madison, "certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he re-
ceives an injury." 120 A nominee who has been subjected toques-
tioning in violation of the Religious Test Clause, however, has 
no viable private remedy against the senator committing the vio-
lation. That conclusion also holds, for slightly different reasons, 
for government officials other than senators. 
1. Does an Implied Cause of Action Exist under Bivens? 
A violation of the Religious Test Clause is a violation of a 
nominee's constitutionally guaranteed right of religious freedom. 
Such a violation therefore should give rise to an implied cause of 
action under an explicit constitutional provision, as in Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents.121 Congress has not created an 
120. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
121. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a discussion of the deterrent rationale of Bivens, see 
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equally effective statutory remedy for violation of the Religious 
Test Clause that would substitute for an implied cause of action 
under the Constitution. 122 Nor are there "special factors counsel-
ing hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress."123 Senators discharging their Advice and Consent duties 
in connection with judicial nominations are not timid; nor should 
they collectively be presumed to harbor invidious motives. Thus 
they would not seem the least bit "likely to be unduly inhibited 
in the r:erformance of their duties by the assertion of a Bivens 
claim." 24 Thus, although it obviously would be a case of first im-
pression, a Bivens claim by a judicial nominee against a senator 
for violation of the Religious Test Clause would, in principle, 
seem well founded. But there are two immediate problems with 
such a theory, one legal and the other practical. 
The legal difficulty would be to identify a remedy. If, for 
simplicity, we assume that the rejected Supreme Court nominee 
is already an Article III federal judge with life tenure, it is possi-
ble that his harm could consist of the difference between his cur-
rent salary and that of a Supreme Court Justice. But if the 
nominee were instead more handsomely paid than a Supreme 
Court Justice (as in the case of many partners in law firms and 
many distinguished law professors), then the financial harm 
would be nonexistent. But obviously lawyers do not aspire to be 
appointed to the Supreme Court to get rich, any more than Afri-
can Americans in the 1950s sat at Woolworth lunch counters in 
the South to savor the cuisine. Therefore, predicating the meas-
ure of harm to the rejected nominee on forgone income is a silly 
exercise. Just as the harm to a person of being denied a public 
accommodation on account of race is impossible to measure in 
dollars, so also is it impossible to measure in dollars the harm to 
a judicial nominee of being rejected from the Supreme Court on 
account of his religious beliefs. It is no easier to measure the 
(presumably lesser) harm to a nominee of being confirmed only 
after having been subjected to improper religious questioning by 
the Senate. 
What then is the nominee's measure of harm? Harm to 
reputation is a possibility. But as a practical matter, the Su-
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994). 
122. Sec McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 151 (1992); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367, 380-90 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299-304 (1983); Schweicker v. 
Chi/icky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988). 
123. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97. 
124. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 151 (1992). 
42 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:9 
preme Court's attenuation, on First Amendment grounds, of the 
law of defamation of public figures since New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan would deny a rejected nominee any viable tort remedy 
resembling libel or slander. 125 Unless a violation of the Religious 
Test Clause would automatically trigger punitive damages, there 
would be a serious risk that a Bivens actions predicated on such 
a violation would be dismissed under Rule 12(b )( 6) for failing to 
state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 126 
Perhaps the remedy sought would be no more than a de-
claratory judgment that a particular senator had violated theRe-
ligious Test Clause.127 Such a private remedy might publicly 
humiliate the offending senator. But it is unlikely to be pursued 
for a second, more practical reason. A person whose nomination 
to the Supreme Court has failed because of religious bigotry 
cannot be expected to prolong his hardship by filing a lawsuit 
against a U.S. senator. In the public's eye, such an action could 
paint the nominee as a Captain Ahab, embittered to the point of 
obsession. 
If the person urging the Senate's use of a religious test were 
himself not a member of the Senate, then a Bivens action would 
fail entirely. In Governor Wilder's case, for example, no Bivens 
action for violation of Judge Thomas's civil rights could have ex-
tended to the governor because he lacked the "color of law" for 
purposes of infringing the Religious Test Clause. In such a case, 
the injured nominee would have to resort to common law tort 
theories of defamation and the like. As noted above, however, 
such claims would have no serious chance of success in light of 
the nominee's status as a public figure under New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan and the speaker's own ability to assert his own 
rights under the First Amendment to speak freely and to petition 
government. 
2. The Speech or Debate Clause as a Bar to Punishment 
Even a senator making public comments about a nominee's 
religious beliefs would, in most circumstances, elude any private 
remedy by virtue of the immunity conferred on him by the 
Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that, "for any Speech 
125. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
126. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). 
127. Cf. Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other 
grounds, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (seeking declaratory ruling that the Religious 
Test Clause had been violated). 
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or Debate in either House, [a member of Congress] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place." 128 The immunity conferred, 
however, is only for speech or debate occurring "in either 
House." If a senator were to advocate on the editorial page of 
the New York Times that the Senate reject a particular Supreme 
Court nominee unless he disassociated himself from certain 
teachings of his religion, the Speech or Debate Clause would not 
grant immunity. 129 The senator's comments would not have 
been made "in either House" of Congress. Of course, on these 
facts it is not clear that the senator would need any immunity, as 
his remarks might not even be considered to manifest state ac-
tion with respect to the Senate confirmation process. 
Nonetheless, if the senator subsequently inserted into the 
Congressional Record a verbatim copy of his op-ed piece from 
the New York Times, the speech or debate presented in the 
newspaper then would be transformed into "Speech or Debate 
[occurring] in either House." A court would surely find unpalat-
able a spurned judicial nominee's theory of harm that would re-
quire the court to reject legislative immunity on the grounds that 
a senator uttered speech offensive to the Religious Test Clause 
in the New York Times before uttering identical speech within 
Congress. 130 
3. Automatic Confirmation of the Nominee 
The Wilder imbroglio in 1991 illustrates some of the diffi-
culties associated with identifying a private remedy for violations 
of the Religious Test Clause. That Governor Wilder promptly 
apologized for his remarks spoke well of his decency, 131 but it 
hardly repaired the injury from his having told reporters that 
Judge Thomas' allegiance to the Pope had to be publicly scruti-
nized. Like a prosecutor's improper remark to a jury, Governor 
Wilder's remark could not be expunged from the public con-
sciousness even if he sincerely regretted having made it. The 
remedy in the case of prosecutorial misconduct in a criminal 
128. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 6. 
129. See United Srates v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,512 (1972); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
130. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973); but sec Laurence H. Tribe, 1 
American Constitutional Law 1019 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000) ("Plainly, it would be 
untenable if the Speech and Debate Clause were used, for example, to preclude a court 
from inquiring into whether legislators' statements indicated that a particular statute was 
enacted out of racial animus or for a forbidden reason under the Establishment 
Clause."). 
131. Baker and Broder, Wilder in Hot Water at C1 (cited in note 6). 
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prosecution is a mistrial. A new jury must be impaneled to hear 
the evidence without the biasing remark. But the mistrial anal-
ogy does not fit a violation of the Religious Test Clause. There 
is only one jury pool-the Senate-and it cannot restore the veil 
of ignorance once it has been removed by improper inquiry into 
a nominee's religious beliefs. Note also that analogizing the 
Senate confirmation of nominees to a trial underscores how can-
didates for national elective office who encounter religious dis-
crimination have no similar process-oriented remedy. In practi-
cal terms, their recourse is limited to being more appealing to 
the electorate than their opponents, which Thomas Jefferson 
and John F. Kennedy successfully did in 1800 and 1960, respec-
tively, but Alfred E. Smith failed to do in 1928.132 But this politi-
cal remedy is circular: If a person holding a minority religious 
belief faces bigotry in an election, his remedy is to gain an elec-
toral majority. This would seem to be a satisfactory remedy only 
in cases in which the religious bigotry was ineffectual. 
The closer analogy than a mistrial for prosecutorial miscon-
duct may be to a coerced confession in violation of the Self In-
crimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 133 The nominee is 
being made to testify against himself in the sense that the in-
tended purpose of the religious test is to elicit information that 
would disqualify the nominee, in the view of his senatorial inter-
rogators, from holding public office. Indeed, the concern over 
compelling the nominee to disclose his religious beliefs should 
be even greater than the justifiably great concern over com-
pelled self-incrimination, for the nominee's compelled disclosure 
about his beliefs is not literally "incriminating" in the least. The 
purpose of the nominee's compelled disclosure is to determine 
his fitness for public office, not his fitness for criminal conviction 
and punishment. 
The remedy for a coerced confession in a criminal case is 
exclusion of the tainted confession and all evidence that can be 
proximately traced to the coerced confession. As a practical 
matter, such exclusion of highly probative evidence of guilt may 
produce an acquittal of the defendant. The rationale for that 
rule is that it deters police misconduct. 134 In the case of a Su-
132. Sec note 4. 
133. U.S. Cons!., Amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself'). 
134. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000). Any analogy can be stretched to the breaking point, and admitt~dly 
I grossly oversimplify here the constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship on the nght 
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preme Court nomination, however, the mere exclusion by the 
Senate of any evidence of the nominee's religious beliefs would 
fail to provide the necessary deterrent effect. The nominee is 
not analogous to a suspected criminal, as the nominee's revela-
tion of his religious beliefs does not constitute any legitimate ba-
sis for rejecting his nomination (the analogy to "guilt" on 
grounds of religious belief). The more closely analogous remedy 
for violation of the Religious Test Clause would be automatic 
confirmation of the nomination, which would more closely cor-
respond to the practical effect in a criminal trial of excluding self-
incriminating evidence that was unlawfully obtained-namely, 
acquittal. 
There are several obvious problems, however, with employ-
ing such a remedy for violations of the Religious Test Clause. 
First, it finds no textual basis in the Constitution. It is debatable 
whether the Senate could be said to have discharged its Advice 
and Consent duties if a nomination were "confirmed" without an 
affirmative act of senatorial consent. Perhaps the Senate could, 
ex ante, enact a rule providing that its unanimous consent shall 
be deemed to have been given to a nomination whenever a sena-
tor has infringed the nominee's religious liberty by violating the 
Religious Test Clause. But a determination that such an in-
fringement had occurred would itself require a vote by the Sen-
ate. As a practical matter, therefore, such a rule would differ in 
outcome from an ordinary confirmation vote only if the Senate 
would vote to find a violation of the Religious Test Clause with 
respect to a nominee who would have been unlikely to have 
been confirmed for other reasons. A person should be con-
firmed for appointment to the Supreme Court because he or she 
is extraordinarily able, not because he or she is a "victim." 
Second, automatic confirmation would enable one senator's 
misconduct to disenfranchise all of the remaining members of 
the Senate on the question of whether to confirm or reject a spe-
cific nomination. Furthermore, the prospect of automatic con-
firmation could lead to strategic behavior by those seeking a 
"free pass" for the nominee: A contrived controversy over the 
nominee's religious belief could be constructed by supporters of 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Admendment. For an insightful analysis, see 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1457, 
1484 (1997) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar, The Constituation and Criminal Procedure: 
First Principles (Yale U. Press, 1997)). 
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the nominee in the hope that it would lead to the nominee's 
automatic confirmation. 
Third, the Constitution requires the advice and consent of 
the Senate on matters of presidential nominees in part to inform 
the electorate of the qualities that make a nominee worthy or 
unworthy to hold high public office. This informative process is 
for the education and benefit of the electorate, and not solely an 
inwardly focused exercise of the Senate's prerogative. Such dis-
course would be foreclosed by resort to the remedy of automatic 
confirmation. 
In short, automatic confirmation would be unwise and 
probably unconstitutional because it would gut the Senate's Ad-
vice and Consent powers in the most consequential of all judicial 
nominations. One can imagine that, the first time that an auto-
matically confirmed Justice joined a 5-4 decision of the Supreme 
Court, a private party would file a lawsuit alleging that the 
Court's majority decision was not lawfully issued; the theory 
would be that the opinion (overturning the 5-4 holding of 
Carhart, for example) was joined by someone never properly 
confirmed for appointment to the Court. 
Though not a viable proposition, the thought experiment of 
automatic confirmation nonetheless is useful because it high-
lights an important asymmetry of two default rules regarding a 
lack of concurrence between the legislative and executive 
branches: If the Senate simply declined to vote upon a nomina-
tion, it would not "pass" automatically, as would a bill presented 
by Congress to the president but not signed by him within ten 
days (as long as Congress did not adjourn). 135 
B. SENATORIAL PUNISHMENT OF MEMBERS 
VIOLATING THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE 
The Religious Test Clause does not appear to support any 
judicially enforceable punishment of a senator that would serve 
to deter future violations of the Clause. The most that might be 
realistically expected would be that the Senate would reprimand 
and fine a senator for violating the Clause and disqualify him 
from voting on the nomination that he had tainted by his im-
proper remarks. 
135. Sec U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 7, cl. 2. 
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In its entire history, the Senate has expelled only fifteen 
members, including fourteen who had been charged with sup-
porting the Confederacy during the Civil War. 136 The Senate has 
considered expulsion in other cases, but it either has found the 
member not guilty or has failed to act before the member left of-
fice.137 In 1995, for example, the Senate Committee on Ethics 
recommended that Senator Robert W. Packwood of Oregon be 
expelled for sexual misconduct and abuse of power. He an-
nounced his resignation the following day and left the Senate 
within a month, without an expulsion vote by the Senate as a 
whole. 138 Since 1789, the Senate has censured an additional nine 
members. 139 
Given the infrequent use of expulsion and censure, it is 
probably naive to suppose that the Senate would have any appe-
tite to punish one of its members for violating the Religious Test 
Clause. If that is the case, then the Senate's reluctance will have 
reduced this explicit constitutional guarantee to having no 
greater legal significance than a book on etiquette. 
1. Disqualification of a Senator from 
Voting on the Nomination 
Section 5 of Article I provides: "Each House may determine 
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly 
Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a 
Member."140 This provision would empower the Senate, acting 
under "the Rules of its Proceedings," to punish a senator who 
had violated the Religious Test Clause by barring him from par-
ticipating in the confirmation vote on the nomination in ques-
tion, as well as any further hearings or debate on the matter. In 
the extreme (but unlikely) case, the Senate could disqualify the 
offending member from voting by expelling him entirely. 
The most obvious deficiency of relying on disqualification 
or expulsion as a remedy is the one mentioned earlier. If one 
senator taints the confirmation proceeding, the fact that he is 
disqualified from voting and ninety-nine others remain to vote 
on the nomination in its tainted state does nothing to remove the 
136. See Anne M. Butler and Wendy Wolff, United States Senate Election, Expul-
sion and Censure Cases, 1793-1990 (Gov't Printing Office, 1995); <www.scnatc.gov/ 
learning/brief_20.htmb. 
137. See Butler, United States Senate Election (cited in note 136). 
138. Sec id. 
139. Sec <http://www.senatc.gov/lcaming/brief_20.htmb. 
140. U.S. Canst, Art. I,§ 5, cl. 2. 
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taint. Even expulsion would not change this situation. Thus, 
while some might regard disqualification as a necessary remedy, 
it would not be a sufficient one. 
Furthermore, as the episode involving Judge Thomas 
teaches, Governor Wilder was not a senator (or even a federal 
officer) and thus was in no position to require that Judge Tho-
mas submit to a religious oath as a condition of the confirmation 
of his appointment to the Supreme Court by the Senate. Gover-
nor Wilder had no vote on the nomination. Thus, one could cor-
rectly say that Governor Wilder's comments could not violate 
the Constitution. Indeed, it is doubtful that any attempted pun-
ishment of Governor Wilder for his comment would survive 
First Amendment scrutiny. These factors simply underscore the 
insidious nature of public debate over a nominee's religious be-
liefs: A senator opposed to the nominee need not personally 
question the person's religious beliefs, as there will be other na-
tionally known political figures not in the Senate who could raise 
such questions before the press. Unless a senator could be 
proven to have conspired with someone outside the Senate to in-
fringe the nominee's rights under the Religious Test Clause, it is 
highly unlikely that any punishment could be imposed on any-
one, either by the Senate or by a court. 
2. Reprimand and Fine Ordered by the Senate under Its 
Power to Punish Members for Disorderly Behavior 
The Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that a senator 
would not be questioned on his remarks "in any other Place" 
than "either House" of Congress. But that guarantee does not 
mean that Congress could not question the senator concerning 
his remarks. Although it might be considered presumptuous for 
the House to question a senator about his remarks on a judicial 
nominee, the Senate clearly could, as noted earlier, punish or 
expel a senator if it deemed such action to be appropriate. 
In connection with a proceeding to punish or expel a sena-
tor for violation of the Religious Test Clause, the Senate pre-
sumably could question the member if he chose to appear to de-
fend himself in a hearing on an order to show cause why he 
should not be disciplined. Given the collegiality of the Senate 
owing to its smaller size and longer terms than those in the 
House, and given the requisite two-thirds vote for expulsion of a 
member, it would seem unlikely that the Senate would expel a 
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member for violating the Religious Test Clause. 141 A more 
likely, less harsh punishment than expulsion would be a repri-
mand accompanied by a Senate order that the disorderly mem-
ber pay a fine, which the Senate could then give to the nominee 
suffering the violation of his rights under the Religious Test 
Clause. There is a recent, well-known model for imposing a fine 
as a penalty for misconduct, albeit in the House rather than the 
Senate: In January 1997, the House of Representatives repri-
manded Speaker Newt Gingrich for ethical misconduct and fined 
him $300,000.142 
The Senate could further demand from the disorderly sena-
tor, upon implicit threat of more serious punishment such as ex-
pulsion or demotion from choice committee assignments, that he 
formally apologize to the nominee in a letter that the Senate 
would order to be published concurrently in the Congressional 
Record and posted on the Internet. To have teeth, the apology 
and publication would have to be ordered to occur before the 
Judiciary Committee's vote on the nomination. 
Because such an order by the Senate would be taken pursu-
ant to its explicit powers under Article I to discipline its mem-
bers, it is extremely unlikely that a court would be willing to re-
view the order. Rather, the court would more likely regard the 
case as presenting a political question that has been textually as-
signed to the legislative branch by the Constitution.143 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers guaranteed that a nominee for national office 
would not be made to divulge or disavow his understanding of 
God. This simple rule has been lost in judicial nominations, 
however, as the controversy over abortion has come to dominate 
every other topic of discourse in American constitutional law. 
Apart from whatever one thinks of abortion and the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence on the subject, this debasement of the 
process of nominating and confirming Justices to the Supreme 
Court is to be lamented. At its worst, the demand that a judicial 
nominee explain his religious beliefs on abortion to the Senate is 
a call to discard the protections of the Religious Test Clause in 
141. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518 (1972); but see Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
142. See Adam Clymer, House, in a 395-28 Vote, Reprimands Gingrich, N.Y. Times 
A1 (Jan. 22, 1997). 
143. Sec Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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the name of advancing some other preferred constitutional right. 
At its best, any theologically rigorous religious testing of a Su-
preme Court nominee by the Senate would be intractable, if not 
also excruciating. The Framers wisely foreclosed the possibility 
entirely. 
Although the Religious Test Clause is a fundamental consti-
tutional protection of individual liberty, a violation of the Clause 
evidently fails to produce, in either legal or practical terms, any 
private remedy for the nominee. The Religious Test Clause also 
fails to provide any judicially enforceable public sanction for the 
offending senator. Unless the Senate steps in to fill the void, the 
abortion debate-or some equally divisive moral debate that will 
inevitably arise in the future-will reduce the Religious Test 
Clause to being no more than hortatory in connection with 
nominees to the Supreme Court. The Senate could provide the 
effective remedy and sanction that are needed by reprimanding 
and fining members who violate the Religious Test Clause, by 
disqualifying them from participating in the confirmation vote 
for the nominee whose religious freedom has been infringed, and 
by ordering that their fines be paid to the nominee. 
By virtue of his oath to support the Constitution, each 
member of the Senate has a duty to respect that document's 
guaranty that a nominee's religious beliefs will play no part 
whatsoever in the evaluation of his qualifications to sit on the 
Supreme Court. If the Senate fails to recognize the significance 
of the Religious Test Clause, it will retreat from the Constitu-
tion's monumental achievements for religious freedom and per-
mit senatorial evaluation of a nominee's qualifications to degen-
erate into precisely the kind of inquisition that Thomas Jefferson 
eloquently denounced and the Framers subsequently forbade. 
